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6248 
IN 
~The Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
LAURA MORRIS, Special Admin-
~tratrix of the Estate of Washing-
'ton Pocatello and Minnie Pocatello, 
~Pis Wife~ Both Deceased, and LUCY 
~J!OCATELLO JOHNSON, MAUDE 
POCATELLO RACEHORSE, 
i .ltisBPHINE POCATELLO, and 
·a;)\ Y POCATELLO, Heirs of 
W~n Pocatello and Minnie 
Pocatello, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
··AMASA L. CLARK, J 0 S E PH 
E. ROBINSON and BOX ELDER 
¢OUNTY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No.6248 
<PETITION AND BRIEF FOR REHEARING 
P. C. O'MALLEY, 
Attorney for Appellants, 
Residence: Pocatello, Idaho. 
4i!' :=If~~~. JRes);;~ng m City, Utah. 
~A 1\X 1 1~- . 
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IN 
The Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
LAURA MORRIS, Special Admin-
istratrix of the Estate of Washing-
ton Pocatello and Minnie Pocatello, 
His Wife, Both Deceased, and LUCY 
POCATELLO JOHNSON, MAUDE 
P 0 CA TELL 0 RACEHORSE, 
JOSEPHINE POCATELLO, and 
R A Y P 0 C A T E L L 0, Heirs of 
Washington Pocatello and Minnie 
Pocatello, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
AMASA L. CLARK, J 0 S E P H 
E. ROBINSON and BOX ELDER 
COUNTY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PETITION AND BRIEF FOR REHEARING 
Appellants respectfully petition the court 
that it grant a rehearing of the above case for the 
following reasons, to wit; that the decision of this 
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court in said cause is erroneous, for the reasons ' 
hereinafter pointed out. 
That in respectfully asking for this rehearing, 
Appellants assure the court that it is not made 
for the purpose of any delay or procrastination to 
prevent the filing in the Lower Court, of this 
Court's remittitur in ~he Cause; that Appellants 
are Indian wards of the United States Govern-
ment, and intend if possible to appeal from said 
decision to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and this petition for rehearing is made 
with humble and true sincerity, for the purpose 
of exhausting every effort for redress in the State 
Court of Utah, prior to trying to perfect appell-
ants' appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. And respectfully assert that this Court 
has erred in its decision filed on April 18th, 1941 
for the following reasons; 
First: The Appellants quote five paragraphs 
of the court's opinion which is as follows: 
Plaintiffs' intestates were Shoshone In-
dians residing on the Fort Hall Indian Reser-
vation in Idaho. The tract of land in question 
was not allotted land but was acquired by the 
ancestor of Washington Pocatello, one Yaotes 
Owa, through homesteading of the land and 
the issuance of patent from the United States. 
Yaotes Owa died in Box Elder County, Utah, 
in the late eighties. Probate proceedings on 
her estate were not commenced until 1917. 
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By a decree of distribution made therein, No-
vember 7, 1919, a one-third interest in the 80 
acre tract in questi9-P was decreed to Wash-
ington Pocatello. However, about February 
2, 1917-more than two years prior to the 
date of said decree-the said Washington 
Pocatello and his wife, Minnie, entered into a 
contract to sell the eighty acre tract to one 
U. F. Diteman, predecessor in interest of re-
spondents herein, for a consideration of 
$3200.00, payable $200.00 in cash with annual 
installments of $300.00 payable in December 
of each year, the last installment becoming 
due, therefore, in December 1926. A warranty 
deed reciting a consideration of $3200.00 was 
executed by Washington and his wife Minnie, 
as sole heirs of Y aotes Ow a, to the 80 acre 
tract, and said deed was deposited with the 
First National Bank of Pocatello, Idaho, as 
escrow depositary to be held by it until the 
full purchase price was paid, and thereupon 
to be delivered to the grantee therein named. 
An affidavit setting forth the terms of the 
agreement was executed by the cashier of the 
bank and filed of record in the office of the 
County Recorder of Box Elder County. Wash-
ington Pocatello died April 27, 1917-less 
tha:1 three months after executing said deed 
--z.nc! Iv1innic, his v:Hc, died 11ay 28, 1928. 
"On January 12, 1920, one Charles E. Fox-
ley was appointed administrator of the Estate 
of 'Vashington Pocatello. The deed placed in 
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escrow, as hereinabove recited, was on No-
vember 10, 1919 filed of record with the Coun-
ty Recorder of Box Elder County, having been 
theretofore delivered by the escrow holder to 
an agent of the grantee therein named. 
"At the time of the trial, the First National 
Bank of Pocatello, Idaho, had been liquidated. 
Foxley, the administrator of the Estate of 
Washington Pocatello had long since left the 
jurisdiction of the court. However, it appears 
from the pleadings that some time after his 
appointment as administrator and after the 
date when the deed was recorded, Foxley re-
ported to the probate court that he had re-
ceived $995.00-property of the estate-from 
the First National Bank of Pocatello, Idaho. 
This report was never passed upon by the 
court. 
"By their pleadings, in addition to setting 
forth the facts hereinabove recited, plaintiffs 
alleged that the deed placed in escrow was de-
livered by the depositary upon payment of 
only $1,000 of the consideration recited there-
in and agreed to 'be paid, that defendants had 
full knowledge of such facts when they pur-
chased the premises and hence were not bona 
fide purchasers thereof. Upon these issues the 
trial court found in favor of defendants and,,-- .. ~ ... :;,.-,~-:-::_,·,: 
against plaintiffs. On the issue of payment 
vel non of the full consideration to the deposi-
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tary before the delivery by it of the deed, the 
court made the following finding: 
" ... that the depositary bank had no right 
to deliver the Deed to said property without 
a full compliance with the terms and obliga-
tions of the Escrow Agreement but the Court 
finds that the Deed was regular on its face, 
recited the consideration of $3200.00 and from 
the evidence in the case the Court finds that 
said $3200.00 recited in the Deed was paid to 
said Escro·w Holder p.nd that the transaction 
with said Bank was not fraudulent ... " 
Appellants again humbly and respectfully 
assert that the trial court erred in its findings, and, 
that this Court has erred in sustaining and affirm-
ing the finding of the trial court, for the reason 
that by making such finding the trial court, and, 
this Court by sustaining and affirming such find-
ing has throvvn the burden upon the appellants 
to prove by a preponderence of evidence that a 
deed placed in escrow not to be delivered un-
til the performance of the condition expressed in 
said escrow, was fully performed and complied 
with before the delivery of the deed, in other 
words that Appellants must prove by a prepond-
erence of the evidence that the deed was wrong-
fully delivered, vvhich finding is contrary to the 
great weight of authority, to, the effect, that when 
it is shown that the deed was placed in escrow not 
to be delivered until the full performance of the 
condition expressed in the escrow agreement, the 
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budren is upon the person claiming title by virtue 
of that deed to prove by a preponderence of the 
evidence, that the conditions of the escrow agree-
ment was fully performed and complied with be-
fore the deed was delivered, and that unless the 
person claiming under said deed does prove that it 
was validly delivered, the deed is void and of no 
force and effect and passes no title to the property. 
And, more particularly in this case where the de-
fendants by their answer and supplemental an-
swer, pleaded the deed as their title, and asked 
affirmative relief, for the court to quiet title in 
them for the said undivided one-third interest in-
volved. 
Appellants have cited such a long array of 
weighty authority on this question in their former 
briefs, that it appears useless to quote further au-
thority, but so as the Court will have some of the 
authorities before it we again cite the following: 
C. J. Vol. 21, 894, 895. 
Kavanaugh vs Kavanaugh, 260 Ill. 179, 103 
N. E. 65. 
Black vs Shreve, 13 N. J. Equity, 455. 
Balfour vs Hopkins, 93 Fed. 564. 
This is an action to quiet title, and involves a 
property right and for an accounting of the rents 
and profits, and title to property, and is an action 
in equity. The defendants by answer and supple-
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mental answer denied the plaintiffs title pleaded 
this deed as giving them title, and asked for affirm-
ative relief and the lower court granted defendants 
affirmative relief. That placed upon the respon-
dents the burden of proving valid delivery of the 
deed. Appellants go no further for authority for 
this rule of law, than the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah: 
Corpus Juris, lays down the rule of law as 
follows: 
''\Vhere defendant pleads an affirmative de-
fense, and sets up in his answer facts in avoid-
ance, the burden of proof is upon him. So, too, 
the burde:1 of proving allegations in a cross 
bill necessary to entitle defendant to affirma-
tive relief rests upon him to the same extent 
as if he had brought an original action to ob-
tain the same relief." 
C. J. Vol 22, Sec. 17, Page 74. 
The only Supreme Court case that the authors 
of Corpus Juris cites in support of that rule is a 
case from the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, 
wherein the Court held as follows: 
"The burden of making such proof was on the 
defendants for the additional reason that the 
decree dismissed plaintiffs complaint, and 
awarded to the defendants the relief sought 
by them in the cross complaint. The burden 
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of proving the allegations of the cross com-
plaint, necessary to entitle the defendant to 
the decree rendered, rests upon them in the 
same manner and to the same extent that it 
would have done had they instituted an ori-
ginal action to qbtain the relief prayed for in 
the cross complaint." 
Herriman Irr. Co. vs. Butterfield Min. etc Co., 
19 Utah 453. 57 Pac. 537, 51 L. R. A. 930. 
This decision of the Supreme Court of Utah, 
is considered such sound law, that it is quoted in 
Corpus Juris, and reported in L.R.A. 
It is admitted in the pleadings, and found by 
the lower court, and also found by this court that 
the plaintiffs and appellants, the heirs of Wash-
ington Pocatello, are the only living heirs of Ya-
toes Ow a the original patentee of the said 80 acres. 
And that they are Indians, wards of the Govern-
ment, living on the Fort Hall Indian Reservation 
in Idaho. Despite this finding, the lower court, and 
this Court, have overlooked the United States Stat-
ute cited by the appellants in their briefs namely 
that in trials or right of property between Indians 
and white men, that once it is shown that the In-
dian had previous ownership or possession the 
burden is upon the white man. And appellants 
again quote that statute. 
Trial of Right of Property; burden of proof: 
"In all trials about the right of property in 
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'''hich an Indian may be a party on one side, 
and a \Vhite person on the other, the burden 
of proof rests upon the white person, when-
ever the Indian shall make out a presumption 
of title in himself from the fact of previous 
possession or ownership." Act of Congress, 
June 30, 1834, C161, Sec. 22, 4 Stat, 763, R. S. 
Sec. 2125 U. S. Code Compact Edition Sec. 
194. 
Appellants contend that is the law of the land 
today, and applies in this case, because not only 
are the appellants Ip.dians, but their ancestors 
through whom respondents claim title were all 
Indians. 
This double burden of proof, was not only on 
the respondents in the lower court but it followed 
them to this court, and for that reason respondents 
had no standing in law or equity to move to strike 
appellants bill of exceptions, as the burden is upon 
them to bring before the appellate court the en-
tire record to show to the appellate court that the 
trial court had sufficient evidence before it to 
grant the respondents the affirmative relief they 
prayed for, and, that the trial court granted. 
Second: Appellants very respectfully assert; 
that this being an action to quiet title, and the 
respondents having answered, setting up affirma-
tive relief in the form of an affirmative answer 
which is the same as a cross complaint, and pray-
ing for affirmative relief that title be quieted 
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in them, and the lower court having decreed af-
firmative relief to respondents, and dismissed ap-
pellants action, and the lower court having within 
its discretion permitted appellants to file their Bill 
of Exception, so as to bring the entire record be-
fore this court; that this court erred, in striking 
appellants bill of exception on the motion of re-
spondents; that by so striking said bill of excep-
tion on the motion of respondents; that this 
Court relieved the respondent of the burden 
that the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, 
by its former decision in the case of Herri--
man Irr. Co., vs. Butterfield Min. etc. Co., re-
ported in 19 Ut, at page 453 and other de-
cisions, has placed on respondents, without over-
ruling the law laid down in the former decision. 
Third: Further, the appellants respectfully as-
sert that this Court erred in striking appellants bill 
of exceptions, for the reason that this is a suit in 
equity, and it is the duty of this court to pass upon 
both the question of law and fact. The appeal in 
this case was taken upon both questions of law 
and fact, and from the whole thereof, see, page 
157, Abstract of Record. Appellants believe it is 
not necessary to quote or call to this court's at-
tention the provisions of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, or the law enacted by the Legisla-
ture of Utah pertaining to the provisions of the 
. Constitution relative to that point, we will rest 
this point on the recent decision of this court, filed 
January 3rd, 1939, wherein Justice Moffat held: 
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"This being an equity case we are required 
to examine the evidence and determine the 
facts for ourselves. It has sometimes been 
stated that the review of an equity case under 
our Constitution and laws is a trial de novo 
upon the record. In equity cases the review 
in this court in effect is a trial de novo on the 
record," Jensen vs Howell, 75 Utah, 64, 282 
Pac, 1034, 1038. "In equity cases, this court 
is authorized to review both questions of law 
and of fact," Independent Oil & Gas Co. vs 
Shelton et al., 79 Utah, 384, 6 Pac. 2d, 1027, 
1032." 
Federal Land Bank of Berkley vs Salt Lake 
Valley Sand and Gravel Co., et al ........... . 
Utah, 85 Pac. 2d, 791. 
In the case of Jensen vs Howell, the Court 
said: 
"This case is one in equity. In this jurisdic-
tion the binding effect of findings of the trial 
court in law cases is different from equity 
cases. In the former, the findings as a general 
rule, are approved if there is sufficient com-
petent evidence to support them, and, pri-
marily are not disturbed, unless it is mani-
fest that they are so clearly against the weight 
of the evidence as to indicate a misconception, 
or not a due consideration of it. In the latter, 
our duty and responsibility in approving or 
disapproving findings vvhen challenged are 
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more comprehensive. In such cases on an ap-
peal and a review on questions of both law 
and fact, and on a challenge of the findings, 
the review in effect is a trial de novo on the 
record. On such a review, if, after making due 
allowance as to the better opportunity of the 
trial court to observe the demeanor of wit-
nesses, or determining their credibility and 
the weight of their testimony, we on the rec-
ord nevertheless are persuaded that a chal-
lenged finding is against the fair preponder-
ence or greater weight of the evidence, or not 
supported by it, vve disapprove it, and make 
or direct a finding or remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings: otherwise we affirm it." 
Jensen vs Howell, Supra, 75 Utah, 64. 
Therefore appellants respectfully assert that 
this court erred in striking the Bill of Exceptions 
on respondents motion. And affirming the decision 
of the lower court, quieting title in that undivided 
one-third interest in respondents. This Court in its 
opinion in this. case does not even say that it is an 
action in equity. 
Fourth: Deed placed in escrow, alleged 
wrongfully delivered; relation back to time of de-
livery. 
Appellants respectfully assert that both the 
trial court and this court has mistakenly applied 
the doctrine of relation back to the time of execu-
tion of this deed in this case. 
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The trial court held, and this court quoted the 
holding of the trial court as follows: 
" ..... that the depositary bank had no right 
to deliver the Deed to said property without 
a full compliance ·with the terms and obliga-
tions of the Escrow Agreement but the Court 
finds that the Deed was regular on its face, 
recited the consideration of $3200.00 and 
from the evidence in the case the Court finds 
that said $3200.00 recited in the Deed was 
paid to said Escrow Holder and the transac-
tion was not fraudulent." 
That holding of the trial court is the essence 
of the vvhole Finding of Fact, and the decree of the 
trial court, wherein the said Court granted affirm-
ative relief to the respondent at their request, and 
quieted title in respondent against the appellant 
for a valuable property right, and this Court de-
clines to determine from the evidence and the rec-
ord in this case what evidence, if any, was submit-
ted to the trial court, that gave the trial court the 
right to make such a finding, because, the re-
spondent, in order to relieve themselves of the 
burden placed upon them by law and the decisions 
of this court moved this court to dismiss the Bill 
of Exceptions, that contained the full record of 
the trial court. If the ruling of this Court( in the 
three cases cited supra, is correct, wherein this 
Court held that in cases of equity, the hearing in 
the Supreme Court must be, de novo, and that the 
Court is required to c~:8n1ine the record and pass 
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on both questions of fact and law, then how can 
the Court strike the Bill of Exceptions that the 
trial court in its discretion settled in order to place 
the full record before this Court. 
The doctrine quoted by this Court in support 
of its ruling on the relation back of this deed, is 
based upon the one paramount provision, "When 
the condition upon which the instrument is to take 
effect is performed." There is no room for argu-
ment, and requires citing of but few authorities 
necessary, in support of that cardinal fundamental 
principal of law, that it is only "when the condi-
tion upon which the instrument is to take effect, 
has been fully complied with," in an escrow ag-
reeme:1t, and, then only in the cause of justice, will 
the delivery of the deed in fiction related back to 
the time of its execution. 
And the duty was and is upon this Court be-
fore it can affirm that finding of the trial court, to 
examine the complete record. Then can this Court 
avoid that duty by striking the Bill of Exceptions 
on the motion of the Respondents. 
Appellants know of no better authority, that it 
is only when all the conditions are fully perform-
ed, and that justice requires the doctrine of re-
lation back be enforced, then the former opinion 
written by this Court in the case of Charles E. Fox-
ley vs J. Y. Rich, a case involving the same Char-
les E. Foxley mentioned in this case, and from 
Box Elder County, Utah, wherein the Court said: 
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''There may be circumstances under which 
the deed placed in Escrow, when all the con-
ditions are performed, will relate back to the 
time of its execution but this is the case only 
when justice requires that the doctrine of re-
lation back be enforced. The title, therefore, 
remained in J. Y. Rich until respondent had 
complied with the conditions imposed upon 
him, namely until he made the final payment 
and paid the taxes assessed against the pro-
perty.'' 
Charles E. Foxley vs J. Y. Rich, 35 Utah, 162. 
The appellants beg the patience of this court 
to again quote a later opinion of this court, quoted 
in appellants former brief, wherein the court said: 
"The controlling question is, does the evi-
dence disclosed by the record sustain the 
trial Court? 
(1) This is an action in equity in which it 
becomes our duty to determine questions of 
fact as well as questions of law. 
( 2) The lease of the property in question be-
ing admittedly in the plaintiff, the burden 
was upon the defendant to establish his equi-
table rights, if any, by the preponderence of 
the evidence." 
Hargraves vs. Burton, 59 Ut. 575. 
In the case at Bar, it is admitted that the deed 
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was placed in escr9w not to be delivered until the 
full sum of $3000 was paid to the escrow deposi-
tary. It is admitted even by this court that Wash-
ington Pocatello, was dead, long before the pro-
perty was decreed, that the court decreed an un-
divided one-third interest to his estate, that long 
after his death and after the property was decreed, 
that the grantee in the escrow or his agent obtain-
ed that deed and filed it of record. The burden is 
upon any one claiming under that deed to prove 
to this Court, that every condition of that escrow 
agreement was fully complied with. 
At this point appellant wishes to cite a few 
more very recent authorities, that holds that a 
deed placed in escrow, and obtained by the grantee 
and filed of record, without the full compliance 
with every condition specified in the escrow ag-
reement passes J10 title, and is not good even in 
the hands of an innocent purchaser. We call the 
court's attention to a recent case of the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma, which contains a very ex-
haustive analysis of the law, namely: 
Home Stake Royalty Corporation et al vs. 
McLish 103 Pac 2d, 72, (decided May 28, 
1940.) 
Tucker et al vs. Kanatzer et al, 25 N. E. 2d, 
p. 823. (Ill.) 
Rothney vs Rothney, 107 Pac 2d, 294 (Cal.) 
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Noakes vs. Noakes, 287 N. W. 445 (Mich.>. 
This Court quotes Thompson on Real Property 
Permanent Edition this authority we have not ac-
cess to, but, we have access to Thompson on Real 
Property, six voluf!lnS, and under the title Burden 
of proving valid delivery; says: 
"The burden of proving the delivery of a 
deed rests upon the party who claims it was 
delivered." 
Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 3866, Vol. 
4 P. 942. On the doctrine of relation back this au-
thority says: 
"A relation back to the first delivery is al-
lowed only in cases of necessity, to avoid the 
effect of events happening between the first 
and second delivery which would otherwise 
prevent the operation of the deed as intend-
ed." 
Thompson Real Property, Sec. 3961, Vol. 4, P. 
1044. 
,_-:~~~.: ... · Fifth: .-AP{l~}lants respectfully assert that 
., ·.~t\~·: " this Court erred~h_vttb ·e. third last paragraph of its 
opinion wherein t e Court said: 
"Argument is made in favor of appellants 
title, to the effect that by the decree of de-
termination .of heirship and of distribution in 
the estate. of Yaotes Owa there was distributed 
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to the estate of Washington Pocatello a one-
third interest therein, and that such decree 
establishes title of the heirs. Further, that 
title to such interest having vested in the 
heirs of Washington Pocatello upon the lat-
ter's death, it could thereafter be divested on-
ly by the act of the heirs themselves or by de-
cree of a competent court. But all this disre-
gards the escrow deed executed by the heirs' 
intestates and the finding that the agreed pur-
chase price was paid to the escro\v holder at 
the time of delivery of the deed. Under such 
finding by virtue of the doctrine of relation 
back of title to the time of delivery of the 
deed (which ·we consider applicable under 
the facts as found by the trial court), in effect, 
no interest vested in the heirs or in his estate." 
Appellants respectfully assert, that the trial 
court, and no\N, this Court has mistakenly injected 
the doctrine of relation back, which is not a rule 
or principle of law, but a mere fiction in law. 
The doctrine of "relation back from the date 
a deed is delivered to the date of its execution is a 
mere fiction in law," and only invoked by courts 
of competent jurisdiction, when it is proven and 
shown by a preponderence of the evidence, sup-
plied by the party claiming under the deed, that 
he is in equity with clean hands, that he has per-
formed every condition that was imposed upon 
him to perform, and that it is in the furtherance 
of justice that the fiction of relation back be en-
e: 
1! 
O! 
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forced by the court. Individuals can not invoke the 
doctrine of relation back to rob the heirs of an 
estate of their just property. 
The trial court and this Court has found and 
held that Washington Pocatello, died April 27th, 
1917. We need go no further than the laws of 
Utah, and the decisions of this court to assert that 
on that date, whatever interest Washington Poca-
tello, had in that 80 acres of land and all property 
immediately on his death vested in his heirs: This 
Court has held in a decision handed down less than 
one year ago, namely on the 13th day of Septem-
ber, 1940, that immediately upon the death of a 
person his estate, both real and personal, immed-
iately vests in his heirs, the court quoting from de-
cisions of Oklahoma, after carefully stating that 
the statutes of Oklahoma were indentical with the 
Laws of Utah, Section 101-4-2. R. S. of Utah, quot-
ed the law as follovvs: 
"The property, both real and personal of 
one vv-ho dies without disposing of it by will, 
passes to the~heirs of the intestate, subject to 
the control of the county court, and to the 
possession of an administrator appointed for 
the purpose of administration." 
Again on the same page the Court quoted: 
"Upon a person dying intestate, the heirs 
of such person become immediately vested 
with the estate, and the estate is indefeasible, 
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subject to the control of the county court and 
the possession of and management by the ad-
ministrator, and it is his duty simply to pre-
serve the estate until distribution to the heirs, 
unless, and in the manner provided by statute, 
the necessity should arise for sale." 
Again this court on the same page said by 
quotation: 
" ..... all property, both real and personal, of 
. -
all persons "'rho die intestate passes to the 
heirs of such intestate, subject to the control 
of the county court and subject to adminis-
tration." 
In re Harris' Estate. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust 
Co. vs. Harris. Utah (Sept. 13, 1940) 105 
Pac 2d, 461. 
The interest of Washington Pocatello, in the 
said 80 acres of land, became vested in his heirs on 
the 27th day of April, 1917, and they had inter-
mediate rights, that co~ld and can only be, taken 
from them through their own acts, orthe decree 
or judgment of a competent court: 
Thompson on Real Property, treats of this 
subject under the title Validity of Intermediate 
Rights as Against Second Delivery: · 
"Intermediates rights are valid as against 
second delivery. The doctrine of relation, be-
ing but a fiction in law, can not be applied to 
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the prejudice of the intervening rights of third 
parties." 
Thompson Real Property, Vol. 4, Section 
3962, P. 1045. 
Appellants respectfully assert, that the trial 
court had no right to invoke the fiction of the doc-
trine of relation back, in violation of Section 102-
11-26 Revised Statutes of Utah, and hold that a 
deed placed in escrow and delivered 19 months 
after the death of the grantor was valid and re-
lated back to the date of the execution, unless the 
court was furnished clear and convincing proof by 
the respondents, that the full amount of the sum 
mentioned in the escrow agreement was paid be-
fore the deed was delivered, and that it was in the 
furtherance of justice that the fiction in law of 
relation back be involved 
That Appellants further respectfully assert 
that this Court has no right to affirm that finding 
of the trial court invoking that fiction in law, un-
less this Court has examined the record, and evi-
dence that the burden was on respondent to pro-
duce, in order to avoid procedure under Section 
102-11-26 Revised Statutes of the State of Utah, 
that the Legislators of the State of Utah enacted 
for the protection of estates of deceased persons. 
Therefore Appellants respectfully petition 
this Court to grant a rehearing in the above en-
titled matter, and restore the Bill of Exceptions, 
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and carefully consider the full record in the case, 
before permitting its present decision to become 
final. 
Respectfully submit~e1 / P- c ()'vv\...~~ 
P. C. O'MALLEY, \ 
Attorney for Appellants, I 
Residence: Pocatello, Idaho. 
GEORGE M. MASON, 
Attorney for Appellants, 
Residence: Brigham City, Utah. 
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